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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
On June 10, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court granted permission to pursue this 
interlocutory appeal. (R. 527.) At the same time the Court transferred this appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002) (R. 527.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002) because this 
appeal involves the review of an order of a trial court over which the Utah Court of 
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) 
(2002) and because this is a case transferred to this Court from the Supreme Court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Issue: Is the three-month statutory limitation period of Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-32 (2000), satisfied by the filing of a breach of contract complaint before the 
foreclosure sale and where notice of the sale and the claimed deficiency is afterward 
given to defendant through means other than the filing of a complaint? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law that was raised below and ruled 
upon in the trial court's Ruling on Defendant's [Fink's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Ruling"). (R. 496-506.) This issue was decided based on undisputed 
facts submitted in connection with Fink's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 496-
97; 199-202; 436-41.) This Court should review the trial court's denial of Fink's 
motion for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling. Estate Landscape 
& Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 
1 
326 (Utah 1992); see also Petersen v. Board of Educ. of Davis School Dist, 855 P.2d 
241, 242 (Utah 1993) (the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss is one of law 
which is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT THE ISSUE WAS 
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
This issue was properly raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment that Fink 
filed in the trial court. (R. 195-198 & 199-296.) The trial court ruled on this issue in 
a written opinion. (R. 496-506 (Ruling on Defendant's [Fink's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Ruling")). 
A STATUTE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THIS APPEAL 
The issue presented on this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 
(2000), which provides: 
At any time within three months after any sale of property 
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may 
be commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, 
and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire 
amount of the indebtedness which was secured by such 
trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, 
and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair 
market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount 
by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, 
costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
bringing an action under this section. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000) (emphasis added).l 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 15, 1999, Joseph Machock ("Machock") filed a complaint against 
Carl William Fink ("Fink") claiming breach of a written guaranty pertaining to a loan 
Machock made to John Harmer ("Harmer"). This loan was secured by a deed of trust 
pledging Harmer's residence as collateral. Thereafter, Machock pursued foreclosure 
of the Harmer residence. On February 19, 2000, Machock foreclosed on Harmer's 
residence. 
More than three months elapsed after the foreclosure sale and Machock did not 
filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
On February 2, 2001, Fink filed a motion for summary judgment on this basis, among 
others, arguing that Machock's complaint in this case is barred because Machock 
failed to file a deficiency action to recover the balance due on the obligation for which 
the trust deed was given as security within three months following the sale, as 
required by section 57-1-32. Machock opposed Fink's motion. 
On March 6, 2003, the trial court heard oral arguments on Fink's motion and 
took the matter under advisement. On March 19, 2003, the trial court denied Fink's 
motion in a written ruling. This interlocutory appeal seeks review of an issue 
presented in Fink's motion. 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 was amended in 2001. The amendment is not 
relevant to the issues in this appeal because all pertinent facts occurred prior to this 
amendment. In addition, the 2001 amendments are primarily stylistic and do not 
influence the issue raised in this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of the facts relevant to the issue presented for 
review. These facts were undisputed in the trial court and were used by the trial court 
as the basis for its ruling on Fink's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 497-98 
(Ruling at 2, ffif 1-9); R. 199-202 (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's [Fink's] Motion 
for Summary Judgment ("Fink's Statement of Facts"), at 2-5); R. 436-41 (Response to 
Fink's Statement of Facts, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's [Fink's] 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Machock's Response"), at 2-7)). The pertinent 
undisputed facts are as follows: 
1. On May 29, 1998, Joseph Machock ("Machock') loaned $125,000 to 
John L. Harmer ("Harmer"). (R. 497 (Ruling, ^ 1); R. 199 (Fink's Statement of Facts, 
1f 5); R. 437 (Machock's Response, ^ 5)). 
2. In connection with this loan: 
a. Harmer executed and delivered to Machock a Note Secured by 
Deed of Trust wherein Harmer promised to pay Machock 
$150,000 on demand (the "Note"). (R. 497 (Ruling, ^ 1); R. 200 
(Fink's Statement of Facts, ^ 6(a)); R. 437 (Machock's Response, 
16)). 
b. Harmer caused a Trust Deed to be executed and recorded in the 
public records of Davis County, Utah (the "Trust Deed"). The 
Trust Deed pledged Harmer's Bountiful, Utah, home (the 
4 
"Harmer Residence") as collateral to secure payment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by the Note. (R. 497 (Ruling, f^ 1); R. 
200 (Fink's Statement of Facts, ^ 6(b)); R. 437 (Machock's 
Response, f^ 6)). 
c. Fink executed a personal guaranty (the "Guaranty") of the "full 
and timely performance by [Harmer] of all of his obligations 
under the Note." (R. 413-17 (Guaranty, ^ 1.1)); (R. 497 (Ruling, 
U 2); R. 200 & 273-277 (Fink's Statement of Facts, f 6(c) & Ex. 
G); R. 437-39 (Machock's Response, If 6)). 
3. Harmer failed to repay the full balance of the loan. (R. 498 (Ruling, f^ 
3); R. 200-01 (Fink's Statement of Facts, ^ 7); R. 439-40 (Machock's Response, ^ 7)). 
4. On October 15, 1999, Machock filed this lawsuit against Fink. 
Machock's complaint seeks to collect from Fink the $150,000 due under the Note, 
plus interest and attorneys' fees, pursuant to the terms of the Guaranty. (R. 1-3 
(Complaint); R. 498 (Ruling, ^ 5); R. 201 (Fink's Statement of Facts, ^ 8); R. 440 
(Machock's Response, J^ 8)). 
5. On February 29, 2000, Machock foreclosed on the Trust Deed by 
holding a trustee's sale under the Trust Deed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-28. (R. 498 (Ruling J^ 6)). This trustee's sale was commenced after the 
Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale had been given as required by Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 57-1-24 and 25. (R. 201 (Fink's Statement of Facts, U 9); R. 440 
(Machock's Response, ^ 9)). 
5 
6. Machock was the highest bidder at the trustee's sale and he took title to 
the Harmer Residence through the Trustee's Deed. (R. 498 (Ruling, ^ 6); R. 201 
(Fink's Statement of Facts, 1J 10); R. 440 (Machock's Response, ^ 10)). 
7. Machock never filed a deficiency action against Fink pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-32. (R. 201 (Fink's Statement of Facts, ^ 11); R. 440 (Machock's 
Response, f 11)). The complaint Machock is pursuing in this action seeks to recover 
the full amount of the note without regard to the fact that Machock foreclosed on the 
Harmer Residence, and without regard to the requirements of section 57-1-32. (R. 1-3 
(Complaint)). On March 6, 2003, at the hearing on Fink's motion for summary 
judgment, Machock's counsel stated that this suit against Fink was not a deficiency 
action under Section 57-1-32. (R. 502 (Ruling at 7 ("[A]t the March 6, 2003 hearing, 
counsel for Machock plainly argued that the suit against Fink was not a deficiency 
action under § 57-1-32."); Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing on March 6, 
2003 ("Tr."), R. 531, Tr. page 22, lines 20-25.) 
8. On February 1, 2001, Fink filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis, among others, that Machock's complaint in this case is barred because 
Machock failed to file a deficiency action to recover the balance due on the obligation 
for which the Trust Deed was given as security within three months following the 
sale, as required by section 57-1-32. (R. 195-197 & 198-296 (Fink's Motion and 
supporting Memorandum.) On March 6, 2003, the trial court heard oral arguments on 
Fink's motion. (R.507; and R. 531, Tr. page 1, lines 4-7.) 
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9. On March 24, 2003, the trial court issued its Ruling on Defendant's 
[Fink's] Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Ruling"), holding that Machock's 
breach of contract claim would be treated as a section 57-1-32 deficiency claim that 
satisfied the requirements of the statute. (R. 501-02 (Ruling at 7-8)). The court 
entered this ruling despite the fact that Machock had never filed a complaint for a 
deficiency, and continued to insist that his claim was for the full amount of the note 
and not for a deficiency. (R. 502 (Ruling at 7 ("[A]t the March 6, 2003 hearing, 
counsel for Machock plainly argued that the suit against Fink was not a deficiency 
action under § 57-1-32."); R. 531, Tr. page 22, lines 20-25) (R. 501 (Ruling at 6 ("In 
the hearing scheduled March 6, 2003, Machock, through counsel, argued that it would 
be entirely appropriate to foreclose on the property owned by Harmer . . . and also 
collect the entire $150,000 from Fink."); R. 531, Tr. page 27, lines 5-14). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Machock became subject to the requirements of section 57-1-32 when he 
elected to foreclose on the Harmer residence. Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 
1, 2-8 (Utah 1995). Section 57-1-32 requires a lender who wishes to recover an 
alleged deficiency to file a complaint within three months immediately following the 
foreclosure sale. If the lender does not file such an action he cannot pursue a 
deficiency claim or any other action to recover on the underlying obligation. 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1987); 
Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1985); G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. 
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962, 963-964 (Utah App. 1989). 
7 
Machock did not file a deficiency action within the time allowed by section 57-
1-32. Machock has never filed or asserted a deficiency claim under the statute. A 
court cannot covert the breach of contract claim that Machock presently asserts into a 
deficiency action under the section 57-1-32. 
ARGUMENT 
L MACHOCK DID NOT FILE A TIMELY CLAIM FOR A 
DEFICIENCY UNDER SECTION 57-1-32, 
A, As a Guarantor, Fink is Entitled to the Protection of the 
Three-Month Statute of Limitations Under Section 57-1-
32. 
Machock's complaint fails to state a claim against Fink because it is not a 
claim for a deficiency judgment as mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000), 
which provides: 
At any time within three months after any sale of property 
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may 
be commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, 
and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire 
amount of the indebtedness which was secured by such 
trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, 
and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair 
market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount 
by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, 
costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
bringing an action under this section. 
8 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000) (emphasis added).2 
Machock's failure to sue Fink for a deficiency within three months of his 
foreclosure sale is fatal to his case. Once a lender has sold the property at foreclosure, 
resort to section 57-1-32 is the lender's only remedy. Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. 
Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1987) (holding that lender's failure to 
file an action under section 57-1-32 precludes the lender's right to recover any 
deficiency); Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1985) ("Section 57-1-32 
provides the exclusive procedure for securing a deficiency judgment following a 
trustee's sale of the real property under a trust deed."); G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. 
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962, 963-964 (Utah App. 1989). In Cox, this Court explained that 
a lender's election to sell the property at foreclosure "precludes [the lender] from 
seeking any other remedy." Cox, 696 P.2d at 1208. The protections of section 57-1-
32 apply to guarantors the same as to principal obligors. Surety Life Ins. Co. v. 
Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah 1995). 
Under section 57-1-32, if the lender elects to seek a deficiency, he must (i) file 
a complaint within three months of the foreclosure sale, and (ii) his complaint must 
"set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, 
the amount for which such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 was amended in 2001. The amendment is not 
relevant to the issues in this appeal because all pertinent facts occurred prior to this 
amendment. In addition, there is nothing in the amendment that would change the 
outcome of this issue. 
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date of sale." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. See also Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 
P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1995). 
Machock did not do so in this case. Machock's complaint does not state a 
claim for a deficiency under section 57-1-32. The complaint pleads none of the 
elements required by section 57-1-32. (R. 1-3 (Complaint)). Machock lost the ability 
to pursue such a claim when he failed to file a complaint alleging the elements 
required by section 57-1-32. G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962, 
963-964 (Utah App. 1989) ("Very simply, if the beneficiary of a trust deed elects to 
foreclose nonjudicially, is owed a deficiency following application of the sale 
proceeds, and wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment, an action for that purpose must 
be commenced by the beneficiary under that trust deed within three months of sale or 
any claim to a deficiency is waived."). 
B. The Trial Court Erroneously Treated Machock's 
Complaint as one for a Deficiency Under the Trust Deed 
Statute. 
Although Machock insisted below that he was not seeking a deficiency under 
section 57-1-32, the trial court held that the statute does apply. The Court ruled that, 
once Machock foreclosed on the trust deed, "§ 57-1-32 became activated" and "the 
Act's language regarding damages and fair market value will apply to the case at 
hand." (R 500, 502 (Ruling at 5 & 7.)) This was error. The trial court could not turn 
the complaint into something that it could not be: a timely-filed claim for a 
deficiency. The court could not deem the complaint to include a claim for a 
deficiency under section 57-1-32, particularly when Machock did not seek to amend 
10 
his complaint but insisted, even at the summary judgment hearing, that he was not 
suing for a deficiency. (R. 502 (Ruling at 7); R. 531, Tr. page 22, lines 20-25.) 
Machock made a deliberate decision in this matter not to seek a deficiency. 
The trial court was not entitled to "activate" the provisions of section 57-1-32 and 
apply the statute without a motion from Machock seeking to amend his complaint. 
Had Machock sought to amend his complaint to state a claim for a deficiency within 
three months of the foreclosure sale, it would have been within the discretion of the 
trial court to allow the amendment. Machock's claim would have been timely. 
As it was, however, Machock did not seek to amend and did not otherwise 
commence an action for a deficiency. He continued to assert that he was entitled to 
the full amount of the obligation from Fink, not merely a deficiency. The trial court 
correctly held that Machock's could only sue for a deficiency, but incorrectly held 
that the deficiency statute had become "activated" (R. 500 (Ruling at 5)) and that 
Machock was entitled to a deficiency under the statute. In effect, the trial court 
amended Machock's complaint to state the correct claim even though Machock did 
not ask the court to do so. 
In Wells v. Arch Hurley Conservancy Dist, 89 N.M. 516, 554 P.2d 678 
(1976), the court faced a similar issue. There, the plaintiffs sued a conservancy 
district alleging that the district had damaged the plaintiffs' property as a result of the 
drainage of water from a lake. The plaintiffs sued under a statute that entitled them to 
recover damages for injury to their property. The defendant conservancy district did 
not file a counterclaim. Acting sua sponte, the trial court "transformed [the 
11 
plaintiffs'] claim into an eminent domain proceeding, the same as though it were 
brought by the defendant against the plaintiffs to condemn all of plaintiffs' 
properties." 554 P.2d at 679. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court's sua 
sponte order was error. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the case could not 
have been transformed into an eminent domain proceeding. The concurring opinion 
by Judge Hernandez explained the Court's ruling in greater detail. He noted that the 
issue on appeal was whether the trial court had authority "to sua sponte change 
plaintiffs' complaint" from a claim for damages under one statute to an eminent 
domain proceeding. Id at 681. "The rules of pleading cannot be totally disregarded 
if there is to be an orderly disposition of cases," stated Judge Hernandez. "This is 
particularly true when a party claims a statutory right, his pleading must contain all of 
the allegations necessary to bring him within the purview of the statute." Judge 
Hernandez explained that, "[u]nder our adversary system of jurisprudence the course 
of the law suit is controlled by the litigants, except in a few limited circumstances. 
That is, the initiative rests with the litigants. The role of the trial court is to consider 
only those questions raised by the parties." IcL at 683. 
Although a court has authority to consider an "overlooked or abandoned 
argument" where it would otherwise "compel an erroneous result," Kaiserman 
Assocs., Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998), the court cannot 
remedy & pleading deficiency that resulted from a deliberate tactical decision by 
plaintiff. Considering an overlooked argument is one thing, but sua sponte remedying 
a pleading mistake is another. The court's authority does not go that far. The 
12 
requirements of notice pleading, though broadly construed, still require "a short plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" Rule 8(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In the present case, Machock's pleadings contain no such 
statement showing his entitlement to a deficiency. The trial court erred in remedying 
that lack on its own initiative. The trial court's effort to fix Machock's pleading for 
him is particularly egregious in a case where, like this one, specific facts must be 
plead in a complaint. Section 57-1-32 requires that the pleading (which must be filed 
within three months of the sale) "shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness 
that was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and 
the fair market value of the property at the date of sale." See also Reedeker v. 
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (even though the law did not bar a 
claim for intentional misconduct, the court held that dismissal of the plaintiffs claim 
was proper because plaintiff had not alleged intentional misconduct in the complaint). 
In the present case, the trial court had no authority to transform Machock's 
case into a claim for a deficiency when Machock himself failed to file such an action 
as required by the statute. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED KIRKBRIDE IN 
HOLDING THAT MACHOCK SATISFIED SECTION 57-1-32 BY 
GIVING NOTICE TO FINK THROUGH MEANS OTHER THAN 
THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT, 
Beyond finding that section 57-1-32 governed Machock's claim, the trial court 
went even further, holding that the statute of limitations had been satisfied. The trial 
court ruled that "the three month notice and filing requirement has been well satisfied 
13 
by Machock, and although Machock's action is now governed by the terms of §57-1-
32, he may now proceed having fulfilled the three month filing requirement." (R. 503 
(Ruling at 8)). The court based its ruling on the fact that Machock "informed Fink of 
the foreclosure sale, and has been in fairly regular contact with Fink regarding the 
suit, the damages and any potential deficiencies." (R. 503 (Ruling at 8)). 
The trial court erred in holding that Machock could pursue his breach of 
contract claim as if it were a timely-filed deficiency action under section 57-1-32, 
even though Machock filed no claim for a deficiency within three months after the 
foreclosure sale. The trial court incorrectly applied the case of Standard Federal 
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). In Kirkbride, a 
lender filed a deficiency action within the three-month limitations period, giving the 
borrowers notice of the pending lawsuit, but failed to serve the complaint within 120 
days. When the borrowers discovered this, they moved to dismiss for failure to serve 
under Rule 4(b), which the trial court granted dismissing the complaint without 
prejudice. The lender then re-filed and served the complaint. The borrowers moved 
to dismiss, arguing that the second complaint was barred by the three-month statute of 
limitations. Id at 1137. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the case should 
Fink disputes this "finding." Machock did not present evidence that he had 
informed Fink about the sale. He offered two letters and the pages of his deposition 
where he identified these letters. R. 441 (Machock's Additional Statement of 
Material Facts, f^ 1); R. 463-70 (copies of the letters and pages from the deposition 
transcript). Neither of these letters advised Fink of the time and place of the sale and 
neither contained any discussion of a "deficiency." To date, Machock has not 
informed Fink what the fair market value is or the amount of any alleged deficiency. 
See R. 531, Tr. page 14, line 23 - page 15, line 20. 
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be allowed to proceed because the lender had filed a complaint within the statutory 
three-month period. The Supreme Court characterized the lender's failure to serve the 
complaint within 120 days as a "procedural failing." The Court explained: 
We conclude that section 57-1-32 does not permanently 
bar further proceedings anytime some procedural failing 
results in the dismissal of a properly filed action. . . . 
A more sensible view of the operation of the three-month 
limitation period contained in section 57-1-32 is that its 
primary purpose is satisfied when the foreclosing party 
provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be 
sought by filing the action.... 
. . . . Under trust deed statutes such as section 57-1-32, the 
creditor is given a speedy remedy of foreclosure and sale, 
but in exchange, it must promptly put the debtor on notice 
as to whether it will seek any balance due by commencing 
an action. Once this notice is given or the three-month 
time period runs, the debtor can plan accordingly. 
Id at 1138 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Machock is not the victim of some "procedural failing" - like not serving the 
second complaint within 120 days - since he never filed an action under section 57-1-
32 in the first place. He has never given notice in any pleading of the foreclosure 
sale, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at 
the date of the sale, all elements that must be pled in a complaint, according to section 
57-1-32. 
The trial court ruled in the present case that "[u]nder the 'more sensible view' 
of Kirkbride, the Act is satisfied when 'notice' is give to the debtor." (R. 503 (Ruling 
at 8)). This interpretation of Kirkbride goes far beyond the facts of that case and 
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could vitiate the applicability of all statutes of limitation where actual notice had been 
given by a plaintiff through means other than the filing of a complaint. This is not 
what Kirkbride stands for. 
In C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victims' Reparations, 966 P.2d 1226 (Utah 
App. 1998), this Court interpreted and applied Kirkbride. In CP., as in Kirkbride, the 
plaintiff had filed a complaint within the time allowed under the 30-day statute of 
limitations, but the complaint was later dismissed for failure to serve. When the 
plaintiff re-filed the complaint - this time after the statute had run but within the one 
year "savings" period - the defendant asserted that the second complaint should be 
dismissed because it was not filed within the 30-day statute of limitations. Id at 
1228. 
This Court rejected the defendant's contention. The Court quoted from 
Kirkbride: "[a] more sensible view of the operation of the [statute imposing the 
limitations period] is that its primary purpose is satisfied when the foreclosing party 
provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be sought by filing the action." Id. 
(quoting Kirkbride, 821 P.2d at 1138) (emphasis added). This Court then stated that 
because the plaintiff had filed the original complaint in time the defendant "was 
placed on notice that [the plaintiff] intended to pursue her claim and thus 'received all 
the benefit the [thirty-day] limit conferred on them.'" Id. at 1229 (quoting Kirkbride, 
821P.2datll39). 
Kirkbride and C.P. are distinguished because in each the first complaint was 
filed within the statute of limitations period. In the present case, Machock has never 
16 
filed a complaint for deficiency as required by section 57-1-32. The trial court noted 
in its Ruling that "at the March 6, 2003 hearing, counsel for Machock plainly argued 
that the suit against Fink was not a deficiency action under § 57-1-32." (R. 502 
(Ruling at 7)) (see also R. 531, Tr. page 22, lines 20-25.) Machock's complaint states 
a claim for breach of contract on Fink's guaranty, but does not allege that a 
foreclosure had occurred or that a deficiency was owed. (R. 1-3 (Complaint)). It does 
not contain the elements required by section 57-1-32. The trial court further 
recognized that "[i]n the hearing scheduled March 6, 2003, Machock, through 
counsel, argued that it would be entirely appropriate to foreclose on the property 
owned by Harmer . . . and also collect the entire $150,000 from Fink." (R. 501 
(Ruling at 6); see also R 531, Tr. page 26, line 19- page 27, linel4.) 
Machock's complaint is precisely the type of action that is precluded if, after 
he elects to foreclose, he fails to file a complaint within three months that specifically 
alleges that a sale has occurred, together with the amount for which the property sold 
and the fair market value at the date of sale. Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1161; Cox, 696 
P.2d at 1208; Surety Life, 892 P.2d at 2-3. This Court explained: 
Very simply, if the beneficiary of a trust deed elects to 
foreclose nonjudicially, is owed a deficiency following 
application of the sale proceeds, and wishes to obtain a 
deficiency judgment, an action for that purpose must be 
commenced by the beneficiary under that trust deed 
within three months of sale or any claim to a deficiency is 
waived. 
G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962, 963-964 (Utah App. 1989). 
Machock is not saved by Kirkbride because he has never filed a complaint for 
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deficiency under section 57-1-32. If he were to attempt to do so now, such a claim 
would be barred by section 57-1-32's three month limitations period. 
IIL IF ADOPTED BY THIS COURT, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF KIRKBRIDE WILL 
ENCOURAGE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS SECTION 57-1-32. 
Under the trial court's ruling, Machock was exempted from complying with 
section 57-1-32's filing requirement because Fink had notice that there was to be a 
foreclosure sale and because Machock "has been in fairly regular contact with Fink 
regarding the suit, the damages, and any potential deficiencies." (R. 503 (Ruling at 
8)). Fink disagrees that Machock has notified him of the amount of the sale, the 
damages, or the potential deficiency. (R. 531, Tr. page 14, line 23 - page 15, line 20.) 
Even had such verbal notice been given, however, it would not satisfy the pleading 
requirements of the statute, which mandates that these facts be specifically pled in a 
complaint filed within three months after the sale. 
More broadly, under the trial court's interpretation of Kirkbride, lenders would 
be permitted to ignore the statutory requirement of section 57-1-32. Very few statutes 
are as precise in specifying pleading requirements. Yet, the trial court has permitted 
Machock to proceed without complying with these requirements. Under this ruling, 
any lender would be permitted to file suit for the face value of the note, conduct a 
foreclosure sale, and proceed to seek a deficiency without complying with the 
statutory requirements that a pleading be filed within three months, so long as some 
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kind of notice was given to the borrower or guarantor. This abandons the statutory 
requirements mandated by the Utah Legislature in section 57-1-32. 
The trial court's ruling ignores the statute of limitations, finding that the statute 
is satisfied "when 'notice' is given to the debtor." (R. 503 (Ruling at 8)). Applying 
the trial court's ruling, a lender would not have to file a deficiency claim at all. 
Instead, he could sue for breach of contract - or some other claim - and the action 
would be deemed timely provided the creditor gave some other kind of notice to the 
debtor of the sales price and fair market value. The trial court's ruling has the effect 
nunc pro tunc of making Machock's action timely, even though he never filed a claim 
for a deficiency within the three-month limitation period. 
In addition, under the trial court's analysis, if a secured lender could convert its 
breach of contract claim against a guarantor into a claim for a deficiency action 
without filing the pleading required by section 57-1-32, the guarantor could be 
deprived of affirmative defenses since he would not be on notice of the foreclosure 
sale when eh answered the complaint. Yet, because Machock's action has now been 
converted to a deficiency action by judicial fiat, Fink has no opportunity to respond 
with an answer that sets forth his affirmative defenses. 
The trial court's ruling sets a procedural rule that abandons the express 
instructions of the Utah Legislature as set forth in section 57-1-32. If that section is to 
be abandoned or changed, it must be done by the Legislature, not the court. See Knox 
v. Thomas, 30 Utah 2d 15, 512 P.2d 664, 665 (1973) ("The wisdom of the statutory 
scheme is not for the court to decide"); Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 
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P.2d 449, 451 (1967) ("it is not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom, or its 
effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or orderliness of the procedure set forth, 
but it has a duty to let it operate as the legislature has provided"). 
If this Court adopts the reasoning of the trial court, lenders will no longer feel 
compelled to comply with the plain language of the statute, which requires them to 
give notice of a foreclosure sale in a complaint, both to borrowers and to guarantors, 
within three months after the sale. The three month requirement will lose its meaning 
if a lender can sue before the sale and then give notice through some other means that 
the sale has occurred. This Court should not interpret a statute in that way. Reedeker 
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah App. 1998) ("a statute should be construed so 
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant"). This Court should reverse the trial court and 
should direct the dismissal of Machock's claims against Fink. 
CONCLUSION 
Fink respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing the opinion 
of the trial court, and enter an order holding that Machock's breach of contract claim 
is barred since he failed to file a deficiency action against Fink under section 57-1-32. 
That section provides Fink with his exclusive remedy against Fink after the property 
was foreclosed. 
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ADDENDUM 
(Containing a Copy of the Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated March 19, 2003) 
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SECOND 
[ DISTRtqT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MACHOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL WILLIAM ("BILL") FINK, 
Defendant. 
CARL WILLIAM ("BILL") FINK, 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSEPH MACHOCK, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
CARL WILLIAM ("BILL") FINK, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
V . 
JOHN L. HARMER 
Third-Party Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 990700380 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and the Court having reviewed the Motion; and Plaintiffs Objection 
thereto; and Defendant's Reply thereto; and the Court being fully advised in the premises enters 
the following findings of fact, and rules as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns a suit to recover $150,000 from Defendant based on 
a Guarantee signed by Defendant. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on October 15,1999. Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment with Supporting Memorandum was filed on February 2, 2001. 
After various filings, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition was filed on December 19, 2002. 
Defendant's Reply was filed on February 14, 2003. A hearing was held before this Court on 
March 6,2003, where the Court stated that it would take the Motion under advisement and issue 
a written ruling. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the following facts relevant to the Court's Ruling: 
1. Machock loaned Harmer $125,000 on May 29,1998, under a Note Secured by a Trust 
Deed for $150,000. 
2. Also on May 29, 1998, Fink executed a Guarantee to Machock, guaranteeing the 
performance of Harmer under the Note Secured by a Deed of Trust. 
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3. Machock made a written demand to Harmer for payment of the full amount due under the 
note on September 22, 1999, but Harmer was unable to pay. 
4. Machock then made a written demand on Fink for performance on the Guarantee. 
5. On October 15, 1999, Machock filed suit against Fink for payment on the Guarantee. 
6. On February 29,2000, Machock foreclosed on the trust deed and was the highest bidder 
at a trustee's sale of Harmer's residence. 
7. Fink was informed of the trustee's sale but did not bid at the sale. 
8. On July 31, 2000, a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release was signed between 
Machock and Harmer in exchange for a Stipulation for Confession of Judgment. 
9. Harmer has paid over $30,000 to Machock on the Note Secured by a Trust Deed, and 
Harmer has also forfeited title to his primary residence to Machock through the trustee's 
sale. 
ANALYSIS 
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to 
submit the matter on the pleadings where there is no genuine issue to present to the fact finder. 
In accordance with this purpose, specific facts are required to show whether there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the evidence in "a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hunt, 785 P.2d 414, 415 
(Utah 1990). 
Having reviewed the parties' arguments, the Court examines the following issues: 1) 
Whether Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 applies to Machock's suit of Fink for payment on the 
Guarantee; and 2) Whether Machock's release of Harmer also releases Fink from performance 
under the Guarantee. The Court addresses each in turn. 
1) (A) Application of Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-32 
Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code reads as follows: 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as 
provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced 
to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the 
property was sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the 
property at the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market 
value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this 
section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable 
attorney fees incurred. 
In Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Fink claims that Machock's claims against Fink 
are controlled by § 57-1-32. Fink argues that this section provides the exclusive mechanism 
which Machock may use in recovering any monies from Fink. Fink cites to Surety Life Ins. Co. 
v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995), a similar case where the plaintiff Surety foreclosed on a 
property secured by a trust deed and then pursued a deficiency action against the guarantors. 
Machock argues that because Fink's Guarantee was one of an unconditional guarantee of 
payment and not collection, Fink's liability is absolute, is set upon the date Harmer defaulted on 
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the Note, and that § 57-1-32 is irrelevant to the case at hand. Machock cites to Valley Bank and 
Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc. 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), to argue 
that with an absolute guarantee, "the guaranteed party need not fix its losses by pursuing its 
remedies against the debtor before proceeding directly against the guarantor." 
The Court recognizes that this is an absolute, as opposed to a conditional guarantee. 
Carrier Brokers. Inc. v. Spanish Trail 751 P.2d 258, 261 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("An absolute 
guaranty is defined as a guaranty of the payment of an obligation without words of limitation or 
condition... A conditional guaranty exists when its terms import some condition precedent to the 
liability of the guarantor.") The Guarantee language is clear and specific, stating that "[t]his 
guarantee is of payment and performance and not of collection, and is primary, not secondary, in 
nature." Guarantee, article 1. Machock is correct in arguing that he may directly pursue the 
payment of the $150,000 without taking legal action against Harmer. In fact, Machock filed suit 
against Fink on October 15,1999, well before taking legal action against Harmer. However, on 
February 29, 2000, Machock did foreclose on the trust deed on Harmer's property. 
At this point, § 57-1-32 became activated. In Surety Life Insurance Co., 892 P.2d 
at 6 (internal citations omitted), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
Although Surety's assertion is correct to the extent that the Smiths' obligations as 
guarantors are not obligations for which the trust deed was given as security, this 
distinction has no relevance under section 57-1-32. The Act does not concern 
itself with which contract or instrument the action is founded on. Rather, the 
issue is whether the action is one "to recover the balance due upon the obligation 
for which the trust deed was given as security." 
It is clear from the plain language of the Act that its protections apply to 
any action to recover the balance due on the obligation secured by a trust deed, 
following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The Act makes no distinction as to 
whether the action is brought against the debtor or a guarantor. 
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The Act's protections apply to "any action to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security" following a nonjudicial foreclosure. Id. "Any 
action" is a very broad phrase. 
Machock argues that Fink's debt became fixed on the day of Harmer's default, and that 
Machock filed his suit before, and not in relation to, the foreclosure. None of this matters in light 
of the very broad, very expansive reading given to the statute by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Machock argues that this is an absolute guarantee, however, "[t]he Act does not concern itself 
with which contract or instrument the action is founded upon." Id. This Court rules that the 
statute applies to the case at hand. 
Machock would question the fairness of applying a statute to a clear, absolute guarantee, 
but the purpose of the Act is clear. "In short, the Act prevents trust deed lenders from obtaining 
excessive recoveries." Id. at 4. Machock received the title to Harmer's personal residence; 
Machock has received over $30,000 from Harmer, along with a promise to pay $3,000 per month 
toward the debt from Harmer; and yet, Machock is still pursuing the entire $150,000 from Fink. 
In the hearing scheduled March 6, 2003, Machock, through counsel, argued that it would be 
entirely appropriate to foreclose on the property owned by Harmer (assuming for the sake of 
argument that the property was unencumbered other than the trust deed) and also collect the 
entire $150,000 from Fink. The Act is designed to stop excessive recoveries, preventing an 
unjust windfall on the part of the lender. With the Act's purpose clear, it is appropriate to cite 
the Utah Supreme Court once more, replacing the word "Surety" with Machock, "[b]ecause the 
case brought by [Machock] is an action to recover the balance due on the indebtedness secured 
by the trust deed, it is the very type of action contemplated by the Act." At this point, the Court 
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would remind all parties that § 57-1-32 is in effect here, and the Act's language regarding 
damages and fair market value will apply to the case at hand. 
1) (B) The Three Month Deficiency Action Limitation 
With the Act's application firmly in place, Fink would argue that the Act's three month 
statute of limitations would apply, and that Machock's claim is barred for failure to file a 
deficiency action against Fink within the three month period. Fink cites to Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158,1161 (Utah 1987), where the "Defendant's failure 
to bring a deficiency action within three months after the sale of the property terminated all of 
plaintiffs' remaining obligations." Moreover, at the March 6, 2003 hearing, counsel for 
Machock plainly stated that the suit against Fink was not a deficiency action under § 57-1-32. 
However, this Court has already ruled that Machock's suit falls under the requirements and 
restrictions of § 57-1-32. On Fink's behalf, the Utah Supreme Court has found that the three 
month limitation is a mere procedural hurdle: 
In the absence of such a plain expression of intent, we have generally read statutes 
that impose preconditions to filing suit as establishing only procedural hurdles to 
suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than absolute bars to suit....We conclude 
that section 57-1-32 does not permanently bar further proceedings anytime some 
procedural failing results in the dismissal of a properly filed action.... A more 
sensible view of the operation of the three-month limitation period contained in 
section 57-1-32 is that its primary purpose is satisfied when the foreclosing party 
provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be sought by filing the action. 
Standard Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1991). This 
court could provide Machock with an opportunity to amend his Complaint to conform to the 
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parameters of § 57-1-32, however, a more efficient approach would simply apply the restrictions 
of the statute to the current complaint. Under the "more sensible view" ofKirkbride, the Act is 
satisfied when "notice" is given to the debtor, Machock filed a complaint against Fink prior to 
the foreclosure, informed Fink of the foreclosure sale, and has been in fairly regular contact with 
Fink regarding the suit, the damages, and any potential deficiencies. This Court rules that the 
three month notice and filing requirement has been well satisfied by Machock, and although 
Machock's action is now governed by the terms of § 57-1-32, he may now proceed having 
fulfilled the three month filing requirement. 
2) The Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release Between Machock and Harmer 
The Court now addresses Fink's argument that by releasing Harmer of his obligations 
under the Note, Machock has also released Fink from his obligations under the Guarantee. Fink 
argues that common law favors his position, citing Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1354 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), where 
Under a surety relationship, the creditor is "affected as to his own powers an 
privileges," and "must especially guard against discharging the surety by dealings 
wit[h] the new principal which alter the principal's obligation...." Restatement of 
Security § 83, comment on clause (c) (1941). The Restatement states that "where 
the creditor releases a principal, the surety is discharged, unless (a) the surety 
consents to remain liable notwithstanding the release, or (b) the creditor in the 
release reserves his right against the surety.... This is true whether or not the 
surety and principal are bound jointly on the same instrument. 
Fink argues that by releasing Harmer without clearly stating in the Release that Machock was not 
also releasing Fink, that Machock also released Fink. Machock counters with the assertion that 
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Fink explicitly waived his rights to raise this defense in the Guarantee, citing to Valley Bank, 742 
P.2d at 108. In the Release, Machock argues that the following language is pertinent: 
For and in consideration of Harmer's execution of this Stipulation for Confession 
of Judgment, Machock, his heirs and assigns, release and forever discharge 
Harmer, his heirs and assigns, from any and all past, present or future claims, 
causes of action, attorney's fees, expense and compensation of any nature 
whatsoever, and whether for actual, compensatory or punitive damages, which 
Machock knows about at this time, or should have known about, and which now 
exist or may hereinafter accrue, on account of, or in any way arising out of, the 
underlying loan transaction between Harmer and Machock. Nothing in this 
paragraph shall be construed to affect Machock's ability to file the Stipulation for 
Confession of Judgment, obtain a final judgment against Harmer for the amount 
due on the promissory note, and seek satisfaction of that judgment through 
judicial liens on any assets or property acquired by Harmer in the Future. 
The Guarantee language in question reads 
2.1 Lender's Rights. Guarantor hereby agrees that Lender may... take any of the 
following actions without impairing in any way the obligations of Guarantor 
hereunder...: 
2.1.2 Amend, modify, delete or add any term or condition of or to the Guaranteed 
Obligations;... 
2.16 Release or compromise any liability of Guarantor or any other party with 
respect to the performance by the Borrower of all or any part of the Guaranteed 
Obligations; and... 
2.1.7 Any other action that may or might constitute a legal or equitable discharge 
of the surety or guarantor. 
Looking at recent case law, in Westside Dixon Assoc. L.L.C. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 44 
P.3d 775, 780 (Utah 2002) (internal citations omitted), the Utah Supreme Court gave the 
elements for a waiver of an existing right, "[a] waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.... There must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and in intention to relinquish it." For the Release to waive Machock's right to pursue 
Fink, the waiver must be intentional. Fink would argue that the intent to release Harmer was 
sufficient, however, the Release language does not clearly release any claims against Fink. 
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Moreover, the Guarantee language quoted above permits Machock to "release or compromise 
any liability of Guarantor or any other party with respect to the performance by the Borrower of 
all or any part of the Guaranteed Obligations...." This Court finds that the Guarantee language 
gave Machock the right to release Harmer without damaging Machock's claims against Fink. 
The Release was a release of Harmer solely, and Machock may still pursue his action against 
Fink. 
RULING 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court Grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
in part, and Denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. The Court rules that 
§ 57-1-32 applies to the present case, limiting Machock's claims to a deficiency action subject to 
the fair market value damages provision of the Act, but the Court also finds that Machock did 
comply with the three month requirement for filing a deficiency action under said Act. The 
Court also rules that the Release of Harmer did not effectuate a release of Fink, and Machock 
may continue to pursue his claims against Fink subject to the provisions of § 57-1-32. 
Dated March A z ^ 2003. 
BY THE qOURT: 
3 ^ W I N C HANSEN" 
[STRICT COURT JUDGE 
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